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Abstract 
The Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) is an ecosystem that consists of -- 
among others -- various networked sensors and actuators, achieving mainly 
advancements related with lowering production costs and providing workflow 
flexibility. Introducing access control in such environments is considered to be 
challenging, mainly due to the variety of technologies and protocols in IIoT 
devices and networks. Thus, various access control models and mechanisms 
should be examined, as well as the additional access control requirements posed 
by these industrial environments. To achieve these aims, we elaborate on existing 
state-of-the-art access control models and architectures and investigate access 
control requirements in IIoT, respectively. These steps provide valuable 
indications on what type of an access control model and architecture may be 
beneficial for application in the IIoT. We describe an access control architecture 
capable of achieving access control in IIoT using a layered approach and based on 
existing virtualization concepts (e.g., the cloud). Furthermore, we provide 
information on the functionality of the individual access control related 
components, as well as where these should be placed in the overall architecture. 
Considering this research area to be challenging, we finally discuss open issues 
and anticipate these directions to provide interesting multi-disciplinary insights in 
both industry and academia. 
 
Keywords: Industrial Internet of Things, IIoT, Access Control, Models, 
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1. Introduction 
The Internet of Things (IoT) is a term widely used to describe the existence of an 
ecosystem where pervasive and ubiquitous computing technologies are used to 
provide connectivity to physical things and make them part of a network where 
people, devices and things coexist and interact. IoT was greatly benefited from the 
development of underlying technologies in wireless and mobile networks, which 
in turn enabled the evolution of both the cloud and Wireless Sensor Networks 
(WSNs). WSNs provide things with sensors and actuators that are used to sense 
and produce, as well as consume data and interact with the environment. 
Advances in the IoT domain are so rapid that although the estimation of 50 billion 
devices in 2020 seems optimistic, the trend is inambiguous and a number of 20-30 
billion seems feasible [19]. IoT is currently used in a number of domains, such as 
smart homes, smart cities, medical applications and the industry. 
Over time, there have been some significant advances in technology that were 
acknowledged as milestones for the industry development, even characterizing the 
whole era: In the nineteenth century, steam provided the means for machine 
development and made the first industrial era possible. Afterwards, the significant 
development, that started the second era, was the deployment of electricity and its 
impact in the industry. The third era was characterized by the adoption of 
Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) that allowed for the 
development of Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) and Supervisory Control 
and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems. Today, we witness the transition into the 
fourth industrial era, that is aided by the integration of a whole ecosystem of 
networked sensors and actuators into every aspect of the production stage. This 
integration between legacy industrial information systems and IoT, was initially 
described by the Industrie 4.0 initiative, mainly developed in Germany to provide 
competitive advantages by lowering production cost and providing workflow 
flexibility [25]. The outcome of the aforementioned integration is known as the 
Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT). 
As in many emerging technologies, the adaption of ICT technologies in IIoT 
introduced issues with regards to standardization and security. Thus, a number of 
commercial entities have created the Industrial Internet Consortium (IIC) which 
has published a number of publicly accessible white papers on architecture and 
security [13]. In ICT, as well as in the IoT, information security (i.e., 
confidentiality, integrity and availability) is of major concern. However, in IIoT, 
additional concepts should be taken into consideration regarding the applicability 
in the application environment as well as the need for safety. Controlling access to 
resources for ecosystem stakeholders is crucial to fulfill both targets. 
Introducing access control in IIoT is considered to be a challenging task 
stemming from the diversity that characterizes these industrial environments. The 
diversity is mainly introduced by the great variety of technologies and protocols 
supported by the IIoT devices and networks. Access control in Cyber-Physical 
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Systems (CPSs) has been examined in [18], where access control models are 
compared and a set of requirements is examined. Yet, we anticipate that further 
investigation may be required to cope with access control challenges in IIoT. The 
aim of this chapter is to provide additional information about the most promising 
access control models for IIoT, examine access control mechanisms able to 
support the described models and propose an access control architecture for IIoT 
based on virtualization technologies. 
Specifically, in the following of this chapter, in Section 2, we provide 
background information on IIoT architectural trends, which are necessary to gain 
visibility to the ecosystem and extract access control requirements. In Section 3, 
major families of access control models and mechanisms are extensively 
presented. Access control approaches proposed in the literature for application in 
IIoT is examined in Section 4. The various components that constitute an access 
control architecture for IIoT are investigated in Section 5. Finally, in Section 6, we 
briefly elaborate on a set of open issues with regards to access control and IIoT 
and provide concluding remarks. 
2. Background 
The IoT is defined by the pervasive presence of things that are uniquely identified 
and are able to interact among them and with the rest of the network [3]. Initially 
introduced by Radio-Frequency Identification (RFID) tagging to provide 
Electronic Product Code (EPC), today IoT includes a number of heterogenous 
devices inter-connected using various protocols and technologies to provide the 
most efficient means of connectivity and interoperation.  
Specifically, IoT describes a network of objects that may collect and share data 
in an autonomous manner and without requiring assistance by humans. Examples 
of such objects are considered to be various type of sensors that monitor and 
measure the temperature or humidity of the environment, the acceleration or 
position of an object, etc. The application scenarios of IoT are considered to be 
numerous, ranging from smart appliances (e.g., smart lighting and heating 
devices) to fitness devices (e.g., Fitbit). 
The International Telecommunications Union (ITU) has released ITU-T 
Y.2060 [29], which is a recommendation that provides an overview of IoT. 
According to the recommendation, IoT adds a third axis in the already existing 
“anytime” and “anyplace” communication, that could be even provided by legacy 
ICT systems. The new axis is called “anything” and represents communication not 
only between computer devices, but also between human to human, human to 
thing and thing to thing. Things are objects that exist in the physical world and can 
be sensed and identified. The identification can be performed utilizing virtual 
entities which can exist without the presence of the physical ones. 
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Due to IoT great success and adoption rates, IoT technologies are also 
embraced by the industry and introduced in industrial environments as a means to 
improve operational efficiency [5]. Therefore, IIoT, “IoT Version 4.0” or 
“Manufacturing IoT” are expressions frequently used to denote the use of IoT for 
industrial purposes. By the end of 2020, it is estimated that more than 10 billion 
devices will account for the IIoT and represent the 57% of IoT spending [19]. 
IoT has already been a part of everyday life, including, but not limited to, smart 
cities, healthcare, agriculture, leisure (smart homes), construction, intelligent 
transportation systems, etc. There are many initiatives aim to exploit IoT in 
industrial environments, such as smart factories, Industrial Internet, Factories of 
the Future, etc. [25]. Although IoT and underlying technologies are well 
established and evolving constantly, adoption in the industry is a challenging task 
considering both the different environment and the fact that there are already well-
established ICT systems in place (e.g., Distributed Control Systems (DCS) and 
SCADA systems) that control and monitor production process.  
Industrie 4.0 is an initiative to support manufacturing in optimizing production 
efficiency and increase product quality. The initiative’s underlying concept is to 
integrate IoT into legacy production field industrial information systems, thus 
being able to create a new concept, the IIoT. IIoT is enabled by the advances on 
Machine to Machine (M2M) communication, network efficiency and simplicity 
induced by 4G and 5G development and of protocols like 6LoWPAN and 
LoRaWAN and faces all challenges that exist in the IoT, such as resource 
constrained devices, heterogeneity, limited connectivity, etc. In the industrial 
environment an important factor is also the requirement for safety [25]. Although 
safety is not directly concerned with information security, being a key objective in 
IIoT operation, it must be taken under consideration to prevent accidents that 
could potentially threat the integrity of humans and machinery, as well as the 
availability of services. Access control models do not take safety under 
consideration as an inherent design feature, so safety provision should be 
considered, if possible, when creating access control policies.  
2.1 IIoT Architecture 
In March 2014, AT&T, Cisco, General Electric, Intel, and IBM co-founded the 
Industrial Internet Consortium (IIC) with the aim to promote the growth of IIoT. 
IIC has released version 1.8 of the IIoT Reference Architecture [16] where an IIoT 
analysis define four different viewpoints, i.e., business, usage, functional and 
implementation viewpoints. In this chapter we are mainly concerned with the 
implementation viewpoint where technological aspects can be revealed and 
examined. 
With regards to the implementation viewpoint, IIC defines a three-tier 
architecture, namely, the edge, platform and enterprise tiers. The edge tier is 
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where data collection is performed from industrial and other end devices such as 
vehicles, machinery, workstations, automations, and all other sensors representing 
“things” in the industrial area. Data collected from the edge tier is sent to the 
platform tier, which is the medium between data collection and data exploitation, 
with the latter taking place to the enterprise tier (upper tier). Nodes residing on 
these tiers are inter and intra connected using different kinds of networks. These 
include the proximity network, which connects assets within the edge tier, the 
access network that connects the edge to the platform tier, and finally the service 
network that connects the platform with the enterprise tier.  
The edge tier includes all the ICT components that are located in the production 
space. Example of such components are sensors, actuators and all other legacy 
devices and CPSs. The evolution of IoT led to the multiplication of the number of 
edge nodes that are characterised by physical limitations on computing and energy 
resources. The platform tier includes all the necessary processing that is required 
for edge device provisioning and data consolidation before those are delivered to 
the enterprise tier where services are developed. IIC does not provide topology-
related constraints so, in its simplest form, platform and enterprise tier can be 
physically either located in premises or be powered by the cloud. Considering the 
volume of collected data, the cloud can be an enabling computing paradigm since 
it may provide the best candidate for big data processing. Connecting edge nodes 
directly to the cloud though, can be challenging considering the resource 
restrictions of many edge devices and latency induced by logical distance. The 
latter can be a potential threat to service provisioning as well as to system safety 
since the delay induced can lead to delayed actions that may cause damage. To 
overcome this issue, fog computing can be used as a middle layer between the 
edge and the cloud, thus reducing both distance and latency. 
Fog was initially proposed by Cisco Systems [4] to provide a location aware 
and low latency virtualized layer between the edge and the cloud, thus bringing 
services nearer to the actual stakeholder. A fog layer is populated by private, 
community, public or hybrid [14] fog nodes that process information from edge 
devices and communicate with the cloud when necessary. In the fog concept, all 
information processing is performed in the fog nodes and little or none in the edge 
devices. Nevertheless, since nowadays network fabric can also provide the means 
to integrate processing into the network itself, a new layer can be developed 
between the edge and the fog. This is created by low-resources microcontroller-
based devices with low-resources and is known as the mist layer [14]. Mist nodes 
are actually embedded in the same environment with the edge device, providing 
more accurate context information and enabling processing at the edge of the 
network, which further reduce the overall latency, provide contextual accuracy, 
and reduce power requirements from end devices. 
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Fig. 1. IIoT Ecosystem 
Although IIC edge tier is clearly matched to the edge layer, it is not so clear 
how to map the platform tier and the enterprise layer. Such a mapping usually 
depends on the specific application domain and topology. In Figure 1 an indicative 
mapping is depicted. 
2.2 Access Control Requirements 
Access control is essential in all systems that require to control and limit actions or 
operations that are performed by a user or process on a set of system resources [6]. 
An access control system is considered of three abstractions, namely, the access 
control policies, models, and mechanisms. Based on these abstractions, an access 
control system is made responsible for enforcing the access control policies and 
preventing them from subversion. Access control policies are characterized as 
high-level requirements that specify how and when a user, or a process, may 
access a resource. The access control policies are enforced through an access 
control mechanism, which is responsible for granting or denying access. An 
access control model is an abstract container of a collection of access control 
mechanism implementations, capable of preserving support for the reasoning of 
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the access control policies through a conceptual framework. Thus, access control 
models are bridging the abstraction gap between the policies and the mechanisms 
in an access control system. 
In [24] an IoT enabled ecosystem utilizing the notion of fog computing in 
Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITSs) is presented. Considering the number of 
access control issues presented there, the following requirements can be extracted: 
• Context awareness: Contextual information characterises the situation of an 
entity and the environment [1]. Context can influence access control decision 
and allow for policy creation that considers factors beyond subject’s and 
object’s identity. Having visibility into the context, access control policies can 
also be designed with an eye on safety on top of information security. 
• Inter-domain operation: IIoT is deployed in multiple domains supporting 
operation of remote sectors under the same administration authority. Any 
access control solution should be able to support a coherent operation among 
different domains.  
• Privacy assurance: Privacy is nowadays an important factor that needs to be 
considered in the deployment of every ICT solution (privacy by design). Since 
2018, it is also a legal obligation in the European Union, defined by the 
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). An access control mechanism 
should be designed in a way that no private data should be ever disclosed. 
• Resource efficiency: Most devices on the edge are designed to perform 
specific tasks and consume the less power possible. This limits available 
resources, both in terms of processing power and storage space, so any 
component designed to run on those, should take these limitations under 
consideration. 
• Manageability: There should be a centralized way to create, store and enforce 
policies, that would not induce extra latency and could function over low-
bandwidth networks, that may even sometimes become unavailable. 
• Accountability: Auditing should be supported to provide respective 
stakeholders with the ability to monitor and reveal any violations or system 
misuse. 
The list of the aforementioned requirements is not exhaustive, but instead it 
operates as stepping stones in choosing a more appropriate authorization scheme. 
In the following, we provide more information about families of access control 
models and frameworks towards their investigation in the context of IIoT 
environments. 
3. Access Control Approaches 
Although there is an abundance of access control models that could be applicable 
in IIoT environments, we elaborate in the following on major access control 
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family of models. This results in avoiding replication of information among 
models having their root on the same model family and help to describe the main 
characteristics offered by these models. Specifically, we provide information 
about the role-based, attribute-based, capability-based and usage control family of 
models. 
3.1 Role-Based Access Control 
In Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) [15], access to resources of a system is 
based on user and role assignment to roles, which have predefined permissions 
associated with them. RBAC may support several principles, e.g., least privilege, 
separation of duties and separation of administrative functions, which makes it 
preferable for use in organizational environments.   
The core RBAC model is composed of five static elements, namely, users, roles, 
and permissions, with the latter being composed of operations applied on objects. 
With regards to relationships among elements, roles are assigned to users and 
permissions are assigned to roles. These types of relations may be of many-to-
many, i.e., one user can be assigned to many roles and many users can be assigned 
to a single role. The same applies for role to permission assignments. Negative 
permissions are not supported in RBAC.  
RBAC has two different phases, i.e., the design and run-time. During the 
design phase, a system administrator can define a number of assignments between 
the elements in the computer system. At the run-time phase, the assignments in the 
system are enforced by the model as it is specified by the security policy, which 
was prescribed during the design phase. Run-time enforcements are instantiated 
through the concept of sessions. The latter distinguishes RBAC from other group-
based mechanisms. During a session, roles for a subset of users are allowed to be 
activated. This means that a user could be assigned various roles during the design 
phase, but these roles do not need to be activated always or simultaneously. Using 
the latter mechanism, RBAC provides support for the principle of least privilege. 
A number of constraints may be also enforceable during a session. 
Apart from the core model, RBAC supports also hierarchies between roles. 
This mechanism provides great flexibility when it comes to the management of the 
policies. Specifically, permissions that are assigned to a role can easily be 
inherited to another role, without the need to reassign the same permissions to the 
latter. For example, we assume two roles R1 and R2 and two permission sets 
PR1=(P1,P2) and PR2=(P3,P4), which are initially assigned to roles R1 and R2, 
respectively. If role R1 inherits role R2, it means that all of R2’s permissions are 
available through R1. The available permissions to role R1 are expressed by the 
union of permissions on sets PR1 and PR2. When hierarchies are represented in 
graphs, the immediate inheritance relation is shown as →. The head of the arrow 
or arc defines both the permissions and user membership inheritance. In the 
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previously example, we have R1 → R2. User membership refers to the assignment 
of users to roles in a hierarchy. In such a case, users are authorized to access all 
the permissions assigned to roles either directly or through inheritance 
relationships. Yet, another functionality that is provided in hierarchical RBAC is 
the support of general and limited role hierarchies. General hierarchies comprise 
the most common cases in role inheritance, and they are depicted as partial order 
sets. However, in more restrictive environments the requirement for supporting 
limited hierarchies may arise. This involves usually the existence of either a single 
immediate ascendant or descendant role in the hierarchy tree structure. 
RBAC is also capable of supporting constraints through static and dynamic 
separation of duty relationships. The main objective in both types of constraints is 
to preserve the security of the system and prevent it from being compromised. 
Constraints are usually used to deliver business requirements. Static separation of 
duty relationships copes with the enforcement of conflict of interest policies. For 
example, let R1 and R2 be two conflicting roles and user U1 assigned to role R1. 
By enforcing a static separation of duty constraint between roles R1 and R2, 
RBAC prohibits the assignment of user U1 with role R2 since the two roles are 
conflicting. This type of constraints is defined and enforced in RBAC during the 
design phase. In the presence of a role hierarchy, the static separation of duty 
constrains are enforced in the same way for all the directly assigned and inherited 
roles. Dynamic separation of duty relationships handles conflict of interest 
policies in the context of a session. In this case, the user has a set of roles 
activated. A dynamic separation of duty relationship is described during the design 
time, but it is enforced during run-time – in the context of a session – to prevent 
the simultaneous activation of two or more conflicting roles. In case of role 
hierarchies, a similar mechanism to static separation constraints is applied, but 
constraints are enforced only on the set of activated roles.  
3.2 Capability-Based Access Control 
Capability-based access control (CapBAC) is based on the concept of capabilities 
[27], which are known to be communicable and unforgeable tokens of authority. A 
capability contains entries for the resources that a subject has granted access to. 
Thus, in a similar way to access control lists, an access control matrix is 
considered that may include subjects, objects, and permissions. In CapBAC, 
permissions are assigned with subjects, and thus support one-to-many 
relationships between subjects and objects. Subjects and objects refer to the users 
and resources of a system (in a similar way to RBAC). Permissions are authorized 
operations that can be performed by a subject on an object. 
CapBAC support also delegation and revocation mechanisms for capabilities. 
These are required to delegate access (indirectly) to other subjects and revoke 
access, respectively. Usually, capabilities are issued in the context of a Simple 
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Public Key Infrastructure (SPKI) to cope with delegation of authorizations from 
one subject to another [23]. Such solutions may be applicable in multi-domain 
federated environments. 
3.3 Usage Control 
A representative usage control approach is UCON [22], which is based on a 
modern conceptual framework. The UCON conceptual framework encompasses 
traditional access control, trust management and digital rights management for the 
protection of digital resources. Nonetheless, functionalities such as administration 
and delegation are still absent. UCON has introduced a number of novelties 
compared to both RBAC and other attribute-based models, like its support for 
mutable attributes and continuity of access decision. Research has also been 
conducted regarding its usage in collaborative systems [30]. 
UCON is formed of eight components, namely, subjects, subject attributes, 
objects, object attributes, rights, authorizations, obligations and conditions. The 
notion of subjects and objects as well as the association with their attributes is 
straightforward. A subject can be an entity in a system and its definition, as well 
as its representation, is given by a number of properties or capabilities in the 
associated subject's attributes. For instance, role hierarchies similar to RBAC can 
be formed through the use of subject attributes. In regard to objects, they also 
represent a set of entities in a system. Each object can be associated with object 
attributes. Subjects can hold rights on objects. Through these rights, a subject can 
be granted access or usage of an object. This type of attributes can serve, for 
example, in the classification of the associated objects, by representing classes, 
security labels and so on and so forth. It is worth mentioning that both subject and 
object attributes can be mutable. This means that the values of the attributes can 
be modified as a result of an access. To the contrary, when an attribute is 
characterized as immutable, its value can be modified only by an administrative 
action and not by its user activity. 
UCON is characterized by a number of novelties, stemming mainly from the 
rest of its components. The component of rights represents a number of privileges 
that can be held and exercised from a subject to an object. In a similar way to 
RBAC's roles, the UCON conceptual framework supports hierarchies among 
rights. Note that rights are not set a priori, but they are determined during the 
access. The access decision is given from a usage function by considering the 
following factors of subject and object attributes, authorizations, obligations and 
conditions. Authorizations in UCON are functional predicates, whose evaluation 
is used for taking decisions, namely if access to a subject is granted to an object. 
In a same manner to the usage function, the evaluation of authorizations is based 
on subject and object attributes, requested rights and a set of authorization rules. 
Authorizations can be characterized as pre-authorizations or ongoing-
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authorizations. The pre prefix refers timely before the requested right and the 
ongoing prefix during the time span of access. 
Furthermore, obligations in UCON are used to capture the requirements that 
must be met from a subject requesting the usage of an object. These are expressed 
as functional predicates and, as already mentioned, they are used in the evaluation 
of access both in the usage function as well as with authorizations. Obligations are 
also divided into pre obligations and ongoing obligations. The former is used 
usually for the retrieval of history information and the latter to check whether the 
requested requirement is fulfilled during the time span of access. Finally, 
conditions in UCON are used to capture factors that are accrued from the 
environment of the system. The semantic difference between conditions and other 
variables, namely authorization and obligation, is that the former cannot be 
mutable since there is no direct semantic association with subjects. 
3.4 Attribute-Based Access Control 
Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC) has gained a significant attention due to 
the development of distributed systems and networks, such as the Internet, and is 
considered to be a logical access control methodology [11]. In contrast to RBAC, 
a standardized ABAC definition is still missing, and thus several have been 
proposed. However, a set of guidelines are provided by NIST in [11]. ABAC can 
provide access decisions based on the evaluation of attribute values, policy rules 
and environment conditions, depending on the particular ABAC definition. One 
virtue of ABAC compared to other models is that its policies are expressed in 
terms of attributes without prior knowledge of the subjects and objects in the 
system. Moreover, subjects and objects in a system may be assigned with attribute 
values without prior knowledge of policy details. This does greatly simplify 
authorization management.  
The ABAC model consists of the following six categories of elements: 
Attributes, subjects, objects, operations, policies, and environmental conditions. 
Attributes are characteristics of the subject, object, or environment conditions. 
Attributes may contain information given by a name-value pair, i.e., a tuple of the 
form: (Name, Value). Both subject and object attributes are able to support the use 
of meta-attributes. The latter provides an additional index for referring to groups 
of subjects and objects per se. Hierarchies in ABAC are intrinsically supported via 
the meta-attribute functionality. This provides ABAC with the potential to express 
powerful hierarchies between elements of the same type. A subject is usually 
interpreted as being a user or process that issues access requests to perform 
operations on objects. Subjects can be assigned with one or more attributes. An 
object can be a system resource for which access is managed by the ABAC 
system. These could be devices, files, records, tables, processes, programs, 
networks, or domains containing or receiving information. It can be the resource 
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or requested entity, as well as any entity on which an operation may be performed 
by a subject including data, applications, services, devices, and networks. An 
operation is the execution of a function at the request of a subject upon an object. 
Example of operations include the read, write, edit, delete, copy, execute, and 
modify commands. A policy is the representation of rules or relationships that 
makes it possible to determine if a requested access should be allowed, given the 
values of the attributes of the subject, object, and possible environment conditions. 
An environment condition is an operational or situational context in which access 
requests occur. Environment conditions are detectable environment 
characteristics. Environment characteristics are independent of subject or object, 
and may include the current time, day of the week, location of a user, the current 
threat level, etc. The above definitions subsequently help in the provision of a 
reference model for ABAC and a formal specification of it. 
In the following, a brief description of well-known ABAC frameworks is 
provided. Access control frameworks may provide useful guidelines when 
considering the implementation of an access control system. With regards to 
attribute-based approaches, the Extensible Access Control Markup Language 
(XACML) and the Next Generation Access Control (NGAC) appear to be the 
most prominent frameworks. Both provide operations to manage policies, evaluate 
decisions, enforce policies, etc. XACML and NGAG may facilitate the adoption 
of attribute-based approaches though the provision of specifications with regards 
to both functional operations and composition of components (e.g., policy 
decision point, policy enforcement point). In the following, we provide 
information on XACML and NGAC, so as to operate as a precursor when 
considering proposing access control systems applicable in IIoT environments.  
3.4.1 Extensible Access Control Markup Language 
XACML is an OASIS standard, currently in version 3.0, which provides a 
framework for deploying ABAC. To achieve this, XACML provides a data-flow 
model, named the XACML context, and a policy language model. The data-flow 
model describes the main functional components, e.g., Policy Enforcements Point 
(PEP), Policy Decision Point (PDP), Policy Authorization Point (PAP), etc. and 
interactions among them. These are used for accessing repositories – containing 
policies or attributes – and getting authorization decisions. The XACML context 
expresses access requests and responses using an XML schema, implemented by 
the PDP for authorization purposes. The policy language model is used for the 
specification of access control requirements using attributes in the context of three 
hierarchical components, i.e., rules, policies, and policy sets.  
Apart from the main components, it is also interesting to refer to the 
terminology differences between the XACML standard and the guidelines on 
ABAC provided by NIST. It is apparent that despite some terms are expressed 
differently, both refer to the same concepts. In the following, we briefly refer to 
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this mapping, as identified in [12]. Subjects and actions refer to the same concept, 
in both XACML and ABAC. A subject refers to the entity that requests access, 
and an action refers to the performed operation on the requested entity. A resource 
in XACML is mapped to an object in ABAC – resources or objects are entities 
that a subject request to access. The environment in XACML is mapped to 
environment condition in ABAC – that is a dynamic factor, independent of 
subjects and objects. Lastly, while the term element is used in NIST’s guidelines 
document to refer to subjects, objects, actions, and environment conditions, the 
term category is used in XACML instead to refer to subjects, resources, actions, 
and environments. 
3.4.2 New-Generation Access Control (NGAC) 
NGAC is a NIST initiative [12] for standardizing ABAC mechanism. It is able to 
express and enforce a wide range of policies. Defined in accordance to ABAC to 
meet its requirements, NGAC uses data/relations and attributes to express policies 
and deliver capabilities, respectively. It also provides a set of administrative 
operations and functions for configuring data and enforcing policies. In the 
following, we provide briefly information on NGAC as described in [12].  
Access control data in NGAC includes elements, containers, and relations. An 
element may be a user, an operation or an object. These maps to ABAC’s subject, 
action, and object, respectively. User and object attributes are supported through 
containers. The latter are used to administer and formulate attributes and policies. 
Containers are used to associate and group elements among them. Similarly, 
policy class containers are used to provide collection of policies.  Attributes in 
NGAC are used in a similar way to ABAC – they represent characteristics of the 
user or object. For example, user attributes could express user roles, etc., while an 
object’s attributes could express its stored data. A set of basic operations are 
provided by NGAC to interface with the data of objects, and administrative 
operations are responsible for the creation of data elements and relations. 
Relations in NGAC are used to express access control policies. There is support 
for four different type of relations, i.e., assignments, associations, prohibitions and 
obligations. Assignments are used to define membership on containers. This is 
expressed through a tuple of the following form: (a, b) or equivalently aà b. The 
semantics are that element a is assigned to element b. 
Associations are used to derive privileges and are expressed as 3-tuples 
including a user attribute ua, a set of access writes asr, and a user or object 
attribute at. The latter association is written as ua – ars – at with the following 
semantics: Users in ua can execute the ars access rights on the policy elements 
referenced by at. 
Prohibitions are used to derive privilege exceptions. Three types of prohibitions 
are supported, i.e., user-deny (u_deny), user attribute-deny (ua_deny), and 
process-deny (p_deny). Each prohibition is expressed using a 3-tuple including a 
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user u, a user attribute ua, and a process p, respectively, followed by an access 
right (ars) and a policy element (pe). A user-deny prohibition may be of the 
following form: u_deny(u, ars, pe). The semantics of the latter prohibition is that 
user u cannot execute access rights in ars on policy elements in pe. In a similar 
manner, attribute-deny and process-deny are expressed as ua_deny(a, ars, pe) and 
p_deny(p, ars, pe), respectively. 
Lastly, obligations are used to dynamically alter an access state. Obligations are 
expressed as pairs of event patterns ep and a response r (i.e., sequence of 
administrative operations). The former consists of conditions, which when 
evaluated to true causes the response r to execute.  
4. Access Control in IIoT 
As stated already, access control can introduce the appropriate mechanisms in a 
system to restrict access of legitimate users or processes in it. IIoT can be 
characterized as a system of systems, and its emerging characteristics, such as 
automation, adaptation, high heterogeneity of devices, spatial diversity, etc. 
require revisiting the concept of access control. Although several works have been 
conducted in the context of IoT environments, access control in IIoT is still a 
relatively new area of research. In the rest of this section, we refer to the latest 
achievements in access control and IoT that appear to be prominent for application 
in an IIoT environment. Yet, we identify research works that has been already 
conducted in IIoT environments. 
An extensive review of access control model and frameworks for IoT is 
conducted by A. Ouaddah et. al., in [21]. The survey includes approaches 
proposed within a period of five years, starting of 2011. These approaches can be 
potentially applicable in IoT/IIoT environments. An interesting outcome of the 
survey is the compilation of a taxonomy for both access control models and 
frameworks. An abundance of access control models has been included, yet all of 
them have been grouped in representative families of models/categories, e.g., 
ABAC, RBAC, usage control, CapBAC, organizational-based access control 
models, etc. In the following, we briefly elaborate on individual models that 
appear to be omitted in [21] and elaborate on generic frameworks – potentially 
applicable in IIoT environments. 
An RBAC model has been proposed in [9], which is applicable in collaborative 
multi-domain systems. The proposed model (domRBAC) supports all the 
components of the standard role-based model (ANSI INCITS 359-2004), 
including support for the core RBAC, hierarchical RBAC, static and dynamic 
separation of duties. Furthermore, domRBAC is able to enforce access control 
under secure interoperation, a prerequisite in multi-domain environments. 
In [17] an RBAC model is proposed for application in IIoT, considering them 
to be multi-domain collaborative environments. Specifically, the requirements 
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under investigation include these of resource sharing and process collaboration. 
The authors define RBAC policies as an authorization route optimization problem 
and provide a solution by proposing an algorithm for solving it. Although the 
proposed solution may provide optimal solutions, its performance may be 
restrictive in some cases, as stated by the authors (e.g., assuming excessive 
amounts of devices and roles). It is provided merely as an administrative tool and 
lacks automation, i.e., it is not applicable in a policy decision point. 
An ABAC model is formally defined in [8] in adherence with NIST’s 
recommendations in [11]. The model’s main elements that can take part in the 
authorization process and a description of its main administrative operations and 
review functions are provided. ABAC approaches intrinsically support highly 
distributed environments due to context information conveyed through attribute 
values. 
The UseCON model [7, 10] is a next-generation model based on the concept 
usage control. UseCON is able to support complex and more expressive policies 
com-pared to existing usage-based approaches (e.g., UCON). Although it is not 
explicitly defined in the context of IoT/IIoT, its main characteristics, such as 
continuity of decision and attribute mutability, may render it applicable in 
industrial environments. Although an implementation of the model is missing, 
formal proofs have been provided with regards to its internal functions. 
Independently of the access control model and its supported policies, a set of 
functional components are required for an access control mechanism to be 
instantiated in the context of an access control system architecture. The 
telecommunication standardization sector of ITU provides in X.812 a 
recommendation of a security framework, which defines among other the main 
functions required in open systems to support access control services and 
mechanisms [28]. Thus, based on X.812 the main functions may include: An 
initiator (e.g., a user or process), a target (i.e., the resource access is required 
upon), an Access control Enforcement Function (AEF), and an Access control 
Decision Function (ADF).  The latter is responsible for access control decision 
making. The decisions are made based on information applied by the access 
control policy rules, the context in which the access request is made, and Access 
control Decision information (ADI). ADI is part of the Access Control 
Information (ACI) function, which includes all the information used for access 
control purposes, including contextual information. Lastly, the responsibility of 
AEF is to enforce the decision taken from the ADF. 
Following the core idea of X.812, existing access control frameworks as the 
XACML and the NGAC provide their own set of functions to support X.812 
functionality. XACML main functions are a PEP, a PDP, a Policy Information 
Point (PIP), a PAP and a context handler (CH). Further information about the 
operations supported by the individual functions is provided in OASIS XACML 
standard documentation [20]. 
In a similar manner, NGAC provides its own functional architecture, too. Its 
main functional components are: At least one PEP; at least one PDP; zero or one 
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Event Processing Point (EPP); one PAP; one PIP; and one or more Resource 
Access Points (RAPs). Further information about the operation of the individual 
functions in NGAC is provided in [12]. 
It is worth mentioning that although both XACML and NGAC frameworks 
share some functionality, yet they differ. For example, the PAP, PDP, and PIP 
appear to provide slightly different functionality in each framework. Differences 
apply also when it comes to their access decision process, which is logic based in 
XACML and enumerated in NGAC [12].  
5. Components Placement 
From the above it is evident that considering an access control architecture for 
application in an IIoT environment requires a carefully investigation of all its 
functional components. This will provide – depending on the applied framework 
(e.g., XACML, NGAC) – indications on where to place each of the functional 
components in respect to the layers, as depicted in Figure 1. The placement is not 
just an arbitrary architectural decision since it affects both the functionality and 
the efficiency of the applied framework in the specific context. 
The cloud is an important element in the development of IIoT. It provides a 
unified, ubiquitous platform for data sharing and can support various applications 
in the context of IIoT. Alsheri et al. [2] propose a cloud-enabled architecture for 
access control deployment in IoT. That architecture includes a layered 
environment that consists of the object layer, the application layer and the in-
between middle layer(s). Specifically, the object layer includes the things residing 
on the edge, whereas the middle layer includes the virtual object and cloud 
services layers. The virtual objects layer is an abstraction used to provide the 
constant presence of things including both current and historical information [26]. 
The cloud services layer provides resources to objects, and finally, the 
application layer offers an interface to communicate with the objects. In such an 
approach, the access control decision making is provided by a PDP placed in the 
cloud layer and the enforcement of access control decisions is performed by a PEP 
placed on the object layer. Access control administration is performed in the 
administration layer. 
In [24] an ABAC specific deployment is proposed where cloud, fog and edge 
layers are used for the various components of access control system. Access 
control administration is provided by a PAP, which is located on the cloud along 
with a PIP that stores subject, object and system attributes. PDPs are in turn 
located in various fog nodes and interact with the PAP and PIP in the cloud. 
Finally, PEP is performed on the edge layer. Integrating PEP on the edge is a 
challenging task considering all resource limitations and the heterogeneity of 
objects that renders the consistent enforcement deployment to be a challenging 
task. 
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PAP is the term used by ABAC models to describe the entity that is used to 
create and manage policies of an access control system. Deploying PAP in the 
cloud makes it available enterprise-wide and it eases any consideration regarding 
policy exchange between remote federations, provided that all required 
mechanisms (e.g., authentication) are in place. The same applies to any other 
model implementation when it comes to policy administration. 
PDP on the other hand provides time-critical services since their use is to reach 
into access control decisions. Access control decision making requires on the one 
hand resources to allow for quick processing of policies and on the other hand low 
latency to communicate the decision to enforcement points instantly upon making. 
Placing PDP on the cloud may not be the most efficient architectural decision, 
mainly due to the distance between stakeholders and the cloud itself. Extending 
cloud near the edge though, which is the case when exploiting fog computing, 
lowers this distance and makes the fog layer the prevalent candidate to host PDPs. 
In the ABAC case, which is a suitable model in implementing context-aware 
access control mechanisms, thus mechanisms which use context to provide 
relevant information and/or services to the user, where relevancy depends on the 
user’s task [1], required attributes need to be retrieved from PDP to perform 
access decision. This information is provided to PDP upon request to PIP. To 
achieve this, PIP should be both aware of all available attributes but also able to 
both retrieve and deliver attributes in real time without stalling the whole process. 
Since most attributes are domain-specific in the industrial environment, 
considering the uniqueness of each deployment, PIP needs to have visibility to the 
specific domain. To achieve this fog can be utilized and host an additional “local” 
PIP to provide cloud functionality in close vicinity to the stakeholders. 
Apart from communication between PDP and PIP, the former needs to obtain 
the policies to consider. Having placed PAP on the cloud and PDP in the fog may 
induce latency or connectivity issues between those. However, given the benefits 
in policy management that cloud provides, it is a matter of context handler 
implementation to perform propagation of policies and disconnected decisions. 
Access control decisions should be enforced from PEP. The enforcement 
usually happens in the edge, where stakeholders exist. Considering an industrial 
environment, main issues in this layer are resource limitation, device 
heterogeneity and proprietary communication methods. As a result, consistency in 
PEP deployment is hard to achieve. The mist layer, as introduced for IIoT 
deployment, can provide the area to deploy PEP. 
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Fig. 2. Components placement 
In the IoT reference by ITU [29], edge devices can communicate either directly 
with the upper layers or through a gateway node. Regarding PEP deployment, it 
can be either integrated with the device or with the gateway. Integrating PEP in a 
gateway enables support for joining proprietary or other devices that cannot be 
natively controlled. Moreover, access control in the industrial environment can 
heavily rely on mist implementation directly into the edge network fabric [14], 
thus potentially eliminating any latency or connectivity issues. An indicative 
component placement is presented in Figure 2.  
6. Open Issues and Conclusion 
There are still issues to promote further research in the deployment of access 
control in IIoT, some of which are presented in this section. 
In ABAC, stakeholder and contextual attributes are evaluated in order to allow 
or deny access requests. In an environment like IIoT it is challenging to limit the 
scope of a domain into a specific area and control interactions with other domains. 
While RBAC models the definition of inter-domain policies requires to exchange 
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identities or roles [9], in ABAC based schemes there is a potential unlimited 
number of attributes that need to be exchanged. 
Trust relationships between domains constituting federations, but also between 
federations, should be established. Moreover, although PIP placement in a 
domain’s fog area is proposed as an effective approach (i.e., for retrieving 
attribute values), interconnectivity between PIPs and exchanging of attribute 
values is a matter of further research and analysis. 
Communication between access control components should be optimized so 
that it can be secure and efficient. Working on this direction, communication 
protocols used in industrial environments, like Constraint Application Protocol 
(CoAP) or Message Queuing Telemetry Transport (MQTT), can be considered. In 
any case, communication between system components should be lightweight and 
reliable, but also ensure the confidentiality and integrity of the exchanged 
information. 
Safety is not directly relevant to computer security. Nevertheless, IIoT is 
deployed in domains and environments (e.g., factories, warehouses, hospitals, 
roads) where human life is at risk and may be threatened of undesirable access 
control decisions derived of misconfigured policies or invalid attribute values. 
Safeguards, possibly based on machine learning techniques, should be included to 
protect against system failures or misconfiguration. 
Industrial applications heavily rely on system availability. It is a critical factor 
that should be considered and therefore access control implementation should 
never threaten it. It is a matter of research to provide safeguards to ensure business 
continuity in case of access control system failure. 
IIoT triggers the fourth industrial revolution. It improves visibility to the 
context and allows for the deployment of new innovative applications. 
Nevertheless, industrial systems should be protected against malicious access to 
ensure business continuity and smooth operation. Access control should be 
considered and implemented based on the selected model or framework. Thus, a 
lot of work still needs to be done in terms of formal specification, validation and 
verification of access control implementations for IIoT. 
Access control appears to be a challenging research topic in the context of IIoT. 
In this chapter, we elaborated on the concept of IIoT and on access control models 
and frameworks that may be applicable in it. We anticipate these directions to 
provide interesting multi-disciplinary insights in both industry and academia, and 
to stimulate further research in this important field of study.  
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